Denis Džanić is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Graz. His current research is focused on issues at the intersection of decision theory, philosophy of action, and phenomenology. He is particularly interested in the descriptive and normative implications of the Bayesian decision-theoretic framework. This includes questions related to the experiential content of credences, the relation between various constraints on rationality and our evaluative practices, and the role of probability in deliberation and agency.
In addition to these topics, which will be the focus of his research within the Knowledge in Crisis project, he is also interested in broader issues concerning free will, reasons, and rational action. He is currently heading a research project on akrasia and weakness of will.
Denis Džanić is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Graz. His current research is focused on issues at the intersection of decision theory, philosophy of action, and phenomenology. He is particularly interested in the descriptive and normative implications of the Bayesian decision-theoretic framework. This includes questions related to the experiential content of credences, the relation between various constraints on rationality and our evaluative practices, and the role of probability in deliberation and agency.
In addition to these topics, which will be the focus of his research within the Knowledge in Crisis project, he is also interested in broader issues concerning free will, reasons, and rational action. He is currently heading a research project on akrasia and weakness of will.
PhD Philosophy, University of Vienna
denis.dzanic@uni-graz.at